BELIEF AND INTERPRETATION: MEDITATIONS ON PELIKAN'S "INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION"
Francis J Mootz ff l ls belief a prerequisite of interpret ation? Can we interpret a docum ent if we do not belie ve that it has somet hing to say to us, if we do not ant icipate tha t we can learn from the text? Jarosla v Pelikan's assessment of the similarities and difference s in constitutional and Bi blical herm eneutics I does not raise this questi on expressly. but his elo quent de scription of how the faithful strugg le to remain true to th eir guiding texts inexo rably lead s one to que stion the role of belief. In this essa y, I first acknowledge the unavoidable significance of belief in the elaboration of a textual tradition . Then, I argue that rhetorical and hermeneutic al principl es clarify the distinction between a faithful interpretation rooted in belief and the inauthentic manipulation of a text for strategic goals.
Belief fost ers commitment to the text, which legitimizes and auth enticates an interpreter's efforts.
W e readily distingui sh the constitutive exeget ica l rhetoric that girds social life from the "mere" rhetoric emp loyed by sop histic interpr eters, characterizing the former as a vital and productive deve lopment of a tradition and the latter as a corruption of the tradition. Pelikan claim s that his goal is to formula te a general meth odo logy of faithful int erpr etat ion, but his refl ections confirm that ther e can be no neat methodological distinc tion between a legitim ate reading rooted in belief on one hand , and a strategic manipulati on of a tex t designed to und ermine th e cause for belief on th e other.
Makin g this distinction req uires a jud gment that can be rh etorically defended but never method ologicall y ju stified; the faithful may prove themselves only in the "dan gero us maybe " 2 of debate and 2. I endorse Nietzs che's famou s "da ngerous maybe" as expressing a willingness to break from biva lent thinkin g and embra ce the realm of rhetorical engagem ent that dea ls only w ith probabiliti es. Francis J. Moo persuasion. As Gene Garver has argued, Aristotle's great advance was to show that rhetoric is an art of character and not just a matter oflogic.
3
I would add that there can be no methodology of interpretation because there can be no methodology for developing one's character.
If belief is central to interpretation, though, this would appear to consign interpretation to a wholly conventional practice immune from critical insight. A popular image in academia of one who believes is of one who does not listen to others (those who, presumably , know rather than merely believe). It may come as a surprise, then, that I will argue that belief is also central to critique. As Gianni Vattimo concludes, in the post-metaphysical age we find that belief returns to the forefront, although not in the form of the dogmatic religiosity of past eras. 4 The relationship between belief and interpretation is thus paradoxical: we must come to grips with the fact that belief is the prerequisite of critique, even as we acknowledge that it is only through critique that living belief-as opposed to doxa transmitted through idle chatter-is possible. Hermeneutical responsiveness and rhetorical elaboration are entwined expressions of a faithful relation to the text; belief nourishes a critical exegesis , which in tum enriches our beliefs.
PELIKAN: INTERPRETING THE GREAT CODES FAITHFULLY AND A VOJDING

CORRUPTION
Pelikan displays an impressive breadth of learning and depth of thought by taking a productive tack on the well-worn analogy between Car dozo L. Rev. 967 (2003) . Nietzsche critici zes philo sop her s for being unwilling to recognize that truth is deeply connected to deception, and he insist s on asking the dangerous que stion : is the value of truth insidiou sly related, tied to, and invol ve d with the se wic ked, seemingly opposite thingsma ybe even one with them in esse nce . Maybe' But who has the will to concern him self with such dangerous ma ybe s'? For that, one really has to wait for the advent of a new speci es of phil oso pher, such as have somehow an other converse taste and propen sity from those we ha ve kn ow n so far-philosophers of the "dangerous ma ybe" in every sense. To rule on the basis of the law alone is a character flaw. Aristotle condemns the man who stand s on his right s in demandin g an ethicall y excessive sort of precision concerning justice in the distribution of goo ds. . . Similarly here. T o argue on the basis of rea son alone is a character flaw, a failure of ethos, and therefore a failure to persuade.
Excess ive prec ision is in both cases unethical because it takes so mething which should be within the range of praxis and judgment and makes it int o a subject for more preci se , scientific det ermination. describes how we can distinguish legitimate interpretive developments of a textual tradition from corruptions of that tradition when interpreters face "cruxes of interpretation." A crux interpretum involves difficulties in interpreting a text, either because the words are difficult to understand or because they raise doctrinal conundrums. 7 These cruxes generally are resolved by the ordinary Magisterium (in the everyday practices of the community) and sometimes by the extraordinary Magisterium (in the official pronouncements by the church or Supreme Court). 8 But resolving an interpretive difficulty is not the same as resolving it correctly. Pelikan emphasizes that it is imperative to distinguish healthy growth in a textual tradition from a cancerous growth that is at once vibrant and self-destructive.
The development of doctrine in both religion and law has involved "the ongoing and cumulative interpretations of the Great Code in the form of tradition and precedent. " 9 The significance of Vatican II to the Catholic Church is precisely that it epitomizes "the ongoing development of doctrine as a faithful interpretation of the original deposit in Scripture and even a faithful interpretation of the subsequent tradition."
10 Neither originalism nor literalism standing alone provides an adequate criterion for correctly interpreting the Bible or the constitution.
11
Therefore , Pelikan turns for guidance to Cardinal Newman's An Essay on the Development of' Christian Doctrine to account for the dynamic, historical, and tradition-bound activity of interpreting the Great Codes.
12
Newman proposed "to discriminate healthy developments of an idea from its state of corruption and decay"
13 by offering seven "notes" regarding the harmonization of tradition and the changing social context. Because the proper development of doctrine cannot be proved by a Euclidean theorem or demonstrated by an Aristotelian syllogism , 14 the seven notes are not a methodology for developing doctrine as much as they are topoi one should employ in defending the legitimacy of a particular interpretation.
Pelikan succinctly relates Newman's seven notes with excellent example s drawn from both religion and law. The first note is "Preservation of Its Type," by which Newman means adhering to the type of textual tradition at issue and refusing the temptation to engage in a different discourse altogether.
One might regard this as a common sensical injunction not to approach the Bible as a scientific monologue or to approach the Constitution as a literary effort so as to avoid corrupting these texts and their interpretive traditions, but there is an important point in making this "universally accepted criterion" 15 explicit. Newman's first note emphasizes that an interpreter must approach the text from within the history of its effects within a culture, and that failure to do so amounts to a relinquishment of the "calling " to serve as an interpr eter.
16
The Protestant Refonnation repre sented a dramatic schism in Christianity , but the Protestant confessions embraced the same general type of interpreti ve tradition that had preceded Manin Luther' s actions; indeed, they claim to preserve the tradition that had been corrupted by the Roman church.
The second note is a substantive corollary to the first, with "Continuity of Its Principles " calling for the preservation of animating principles despite changes in the details of the textual tradition. Pelikan argues that the development of the doctrine of the Trinity permitted the Church to preserve the competing principles of monothei sm and the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus.
17 Just as an interpreter must approach the text with respect for its type, so too the interpret er must maintain the fundamental principles of the textual tradition, even if doing so requires significant doctrinal development.
Newman 's first two notes will strike the modem critical consciousness as extremely problematic: how can one critically appraise and develop a tradition if one is consigned to approach the text within its received tradition? And yet, Pelikan surely is justified in recalling Newman 's insights, inasmuch as one cannot imagine developing a 
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textual tradition that spans centuries or millennia without requmng adherence to its genre and core principles. But this is just to say that belief inevitably is at the center of the interpretive undertaking. The interpreter must give herself over to the tradition by respecting its type and established principles and believing in the legitimacy and worth of the tradition, even if there is an unending dispute among believers about what faithfulness may require in particular interpretive situations.
The next four notes in Newman's account elaborate the goal of developing principles within a genre. The third note, "Its Power of Assimilation," concerns the necessity of incorporating knowledge external to the tradition into its development, as occurs when Biblical interpreters take account of natural science and constitutional interpreters take account of social science.
18
The fourth note is designated, "Its Logical Sequence," by which Newman means that interpretations must develop doctrine in a manner that appears almost compelled by the preceding tradition, with precipitous shifts viewed as a corruption of interpretation.
19
The fifth note, "Anticipation of Its Future," is related to the fourth, in that a healthy development of a textual tradition requires that contemporary developments be regarded as having been anticipated in the tradition, although these anticipations might be "vague and isolated." 2° Finally, the sixth note, "Conservative Action upon its Past," declares the importance of preserving antecedent developments and avoiding the corruption that occurs by making a sharp break from the prior tradition.
21
Interpretive developments must conserve the past and bring its principles to bear in the present, rather than rejecting the foregoing tradition altogether.
These four notes provide unexceptional gloss on the idea that interpreters must remain faithful to the tradition and believe that the text continues to speak to the interpreter's world; they counsel interpreters to mediate adaptation and preservation, innovation and constraint, and literalism and dynamism. But finding the golden hermeneutical mean in practice is no easy task. Pelikan concludes that Newman's triumphant assessment applies equally to the long tradition of constitutional hermeneutics.
24
Newman's seven notes purport to be criteria of faithful interpretation and to suggest the means for distinguishing corruptions of that tradition, but Pelikan fails to acknowledge that Newman's assessment of the Catholic tradition necessarily issues from within that tradition.
Newman speaks as a believ er; his assessment might be persuasive , but it will not operate as a proof when directed to nonbelievers. What are we to make of the claims by Protestant confessions that Catholicism represents some manner of a corruption of the Christian faith , or Judaism 's assertion that Christianity itself is a corruption of the original Covenant with God? In the modem era , we readily accept a plurality of incommensurable religious faiths, all of which assert their primacy within a liberal legal tradition that tolerates them all as useful cultural resources but officially subscribes to none. Newman may spea k to fellow believers and persuade them of the vitality of the Roman Catholic interpretive tradition, but he cannot dispro ve the vitality of 
385]
BELIEF AND INTERPRETATION 391
Islam or Judaism from an extra-traditionary perspective. Although we may have agreed to adopt a relativist perspective as to competing interpretations of spirituality such that no single faith may lay claim to truth or universalism in the public sphere, it should be obvious that we cannot do so with respect to our "civic religion" of constitutionalism.
The very challenge of constitutionalism is to faithfully develop a continuous governance tradition that is legitimate for the entire polity. To allude to the concessions that we have made in respect of our contemporary religious pluralism: can we suffer a situation in which Anti-Federalists and Federalists both assert that they have defined the core of our constitutional tradition; can we permit royalists to persist in challenging the break with England as a fundamental corruption of our legal tradition; can we take account of anarchists who simply do not believe in the authority of law; can we, in other words, consign constitutionalism to a matter merely of belief?
Pelikan 's work leads me to the questions that motivate this essay. Can healthy and valid developments of a textual tradition be recognized only by believers? If so, does this discount the possibility of rigorous critique of interpretive traditions and consign these traditions to be insular and self-replicating, leaving us with competing traditions each of which have believers but none of which can definitively establish itself as a legitimate and vital tradition?
Pelikan's assessment of the similarities of Biblical and constitutional hermeneutics only raises these questions; contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy supplements his discussion and points toward a resolution.
GADAMER: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics acknowledges the central role of belief in understanding and critique, and so I tum first to his philosophy in an effort to expand on Pelikan's themes.
25 Gadamer argues that textual understanding emerges from a "hermeneutical circle" rather than as the product of a linear methodology. 26 The hermeneutical circle refers to the constant relational tension between the text in its entirety and the specific part of the text under consideration. Critics often charge that this circle is vicious because the interpreter can't 25. The following synopsis of Gadamer's philosophy is best explained in detail in his magnum opus. Hans 
27
Martin Heidegger ' s pathbreaking work demonstrated that the henneneutical circle is vicious only when view ed through the myopic lens of modem methodologism. 28 Just as the "chicken or the egg" dilemma poses a problem only wh en one look s at both objects atemporally and then attempts to di scern a causal link between the static entiti es, so too the relationship of whole and part becomes problematic when the activit y of understandin g is drained of its dynamic and hi storical character . Gadamer expand s on Heidegger 's earl y phenomenology by empha sizing that an interpreter comes to a text with fore-understandings ( or, prejudice s) that help to shape the interpreter 's anticipation that the text carries a coherent message. The reader ' s "anticipation of completeness" is constantly re vise d in the cour se of reading ; consequentl y, the relation ship of whole to part is neithe r hierarchical nor directing, but rather is mutually implic ating .2'> The se ba sic pr emi ses of philosophical henneneutic s amount to a phenom enology of the role of belief in interpretation.
The reader 's prejudice s (including the prejudice that the work bears a coherent message that can be under s tood) represent th e reader's belief in the value of the text. Interpretation occurs in the structure of question and an swe r: the reader po ses questions to the text, but the text also poses questions to the reader. It is the reader 's faith in the value of thi s interpretive conv ersati on that drives her to engage the text.
Critics challenge Gadamer for conferring authority on the text and pennitting faith to devolve into uncritical deference . 30 This charge is familiar in both Biblical and con stitutional hermeneutics. How can a 27. Id. at266-267. 28. Heidegg er emphasizes that to see vicio usness in the hermeneutica l circle of historica l underst anding "and to look fo r ways to avoid it. even to feel' thal it is an inev itable imp erfec tio11 . is to misunderstand w1ders1a11di11g fr om the ground up. . . . Wha t is decisive is not to get out or the circle, but to get in it in the right way. '' Manin Heidegger, Being and Time 143 (Joan Stamba ugh trans., SUNY Press 1996) (p . 153, 7th German ed. 1953).
29. Gadamer discusses this problem in broader tenns by discuss ing the role of experie nce in the development of moral-practical wisdom. A person can' t make an ethical choice with out having practical wisdom, but practical wisdom can 't be culti vated except by making ethical choices. Following Aristotle , Gadamer argu es that this situation highlights the ce ntrn lity of experience as the means by which this henne neuti ca l circle of decis ion and action is enac ted. Gadamcr, supra n. 25. at 346-362.
30. Paul Ricocu r famously mediat ed the Gadamer-Habem1as dispute. arguing in a cha ritable and respon sible fashion that Gadamer 's hem1eneutics tended to discount the possi bil ity and role of critique. S1ce Paul Ricoeur. 
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believer interpreting the Bible, or a judge interpr eting the Constituti on, rise above dogmati sm and the historical context of oppression and scholasticism in which these documents have been appli ed in the past? Gadamer's answer is that the interpreter's faithful embrace of the text is prec isely what permit s the reader to achieve crit ical distanc e. He captures this dimen sion of interpret ation with his notion of the "fusion of hor izons."
31
Wh en interpr eting a text, the reader's horizon al pre-unde rstanding s are confronted and affected . Gadamer regards the text as an active dialogue partn er, arguing that under standing occurs as the text takes on meaning in light of the reader's prejudices and the reader's prejudi ces are adjus ted in light of the text. Thi s amount s to a "fusion of horizons, " not in the sense of merging into a unity but rather as a mutual engagemen t.
32
Gadamer uses the met aphor of conversation to explore the critical distance inherent in interpretation. By conversation, he does not mean superfici al banter or socia l pleasantrie s; rather, he calls to mind genuine conversations as a dialogic activity that engages the particip ants. He rejects the exegetical model of a reader prost rate before a classical text that must be honored with reverent defer ence for the truths contain ed within it. Instead, the text is a provoca tion and challenge that has an evo lving "effect ive history." The interpr eter finds that her prejudices are put at risk and brought up short, and this is the moment of critical insight. 32. Gadamer, s upra n. 25, at 306-307. 33. Gadamer emphasize s that it is the willingne ss to engage a tcx1. fueled by a he lief that the text has $Omething to offer . that genera tes critical distance. Gadame r equa1es a text with a conversation partne r, and so the followin g quote applies equally to a reader who see ks to interpr et a text.
Who has not had the experienc e-especia lly before the other whom we want to pers uade-of how the reasons that one had for one's own view . and even the reason s that speak against one's own view rush into words. The mere presence of the oth er before whom we stand helps us to break up our ow n bias and narr owness . even before he opens his mou th to make a reply. That which becomes a clialogical experi ence for u;; here is not linuted to the sphere of arguments and counterar guments the exchange and unification of which may be the end meaning of every confrontation. Rath er. as the experiences that have been descri bed indicate , there is 'something else in this experie nce. 
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Gadamer's hermeneutic account will not seem sophisticated enough to address the question at hand. Critics may doubt that the decentering experience of putting prejudices at risk in interpretation is possible and suggest that readers simply fool themselves and either foist their prejudices on the text or uncritically absorb the dogma of the text. How can we be sure that genuine interpretation founded in belief is possible, and that we are not consigned either to slavish exegesis to outmoded texts or hubristic manipulation of the texts by a contemporary interpreter? Has Gadamer's philosophical discourse added anything to Newman's characterization of the healthy development of a tradition?
VATTlMO: NIETZSCHEAN HERMENEUTICS AND THE RETURN OF BELIEF Gianni Vattimo's "weak thought" brings Gadamer 's hermeneutical insights to bear on these questions in a very direct manner. Although Vattimo claims to be siding with Nietzsche against his former teacher, Gadamer, I have argued elsewhere that his work can be seen as an appropriate extension of Gadamer's themes. 35 Vattimo emphasizes the central paradox of post-modernity: the collapse of methodologism and its dream of complete de-mystification has opened the space for a return to belief.3 6 Religion is a fact of the world, inasmuch as society is indelibly marked by the effective-history of religious texts. Philosophy simply has no standing to declare that this influence is "false" or to 35 . J contend that Vattimo helps to show how we might read Gadamer and Nietzsche together producti vely, and reject Vattimo's overly sharp distinction between his hermeneutical philosophy of "weak thought" rooted in Nietzsche and the later Heidegger. and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics rooted in both the early and later Heidegger. Mootz. supra n. 2. at 1017-1026.
36. Vattimo suggests that demythification "has finally turned against itself:" and "the untenability of scientistic and historicist rntionalism -both of which repudiated the very possibility of religion-has been widely accepted as a given in our culture." Gianni Vattimo, Belief29 (Luca d'l santo & David Webb trans ., Stanford U. Press 1999). As Vattimo 's translator summarizes, Nietzsche 's nihilism opens, paradoxically , the way to the recovery of the divine in our culture . The disappearance of the moral-metaph ysical God (the foundation principle of metaphysics) , then, may signify that the divine source may announce itself in the drift of interpretation . Luca d' Isanto, Introduction, in Vattimo, id. at 1, 16-17.
On a personal level. Vattimo argues that he was attracted to the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche precisely because they spoke to a Christian subs trate that remained part of him even while becoming disaffected under the conditions otmodernity.
In short: I have begun to take Christianity seriously again because J have constructed a phil osophy inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegg er, and have interpreted my experienc e in the contemporary world in the light of it; yet in all probabilit y I constructed my philosophy with a preferen ce for these authors preci sely because I started with the Christifill inheritance , which I have now found again. though, in reality, I had never abandoned it. Vattimo, Belief, supra, at 33.
[Vol. XXI provide a means of completely overcoming this heritage ( Oberwindung). Rather, philosophy is a means of working through a situation of thrownness (Verwindung), of awakening to find that we are still dreaming and can only continue the dream creatively.
37 Vattimo concludes that he can only assert that he believes that he believe s, acknowledging a lived condition of thrown -ness (Abg rund) in which he is a believer without access to a mean s of validating his belief as truth. 38 Belief is a lived condition that can't be disavowed; it can only be taken up and advanced more or less persuasively.
39
Vattimo's nihili stic "weak thought" radicalizes Gadamer's account of interpretation. It does not refut e the criticisms of interpretations grounded in belief as much as it simply moves on. Radical critique-in the sense of stepping outside our beliefs to see the world as it really is, unmediated by textual traditions-is a modernist fairy tale; philosoph y is incapable of resc uing us from belief. But this is not to say that Vattimo is a nihilist in the commonl y accepted sense of the word. His "weak thought" rejects the po ssibility of stron g foundational truth s but continues to place faith in thinking, however "wea k" and chastened thinking may now be . Perhaps not by its essential nature. but de /aero, . . . religion comes to be experienced as a return . In religion , somethi ng that wc had thought irrevocably forgotten is made present again. a domiant rrace is reawakene d, a wou nd re-opened, the repressed rerurn s, and what we took to be an Uberwindung (overcoming , realization and thus a sett ing aside) is no more than a Verwind1m~, a long convalescence that has once again come to term s with the indelible trace of it s sickne ss. clear that his rejection of metaphysical truth . Tnith wtth a capital "T," does n ot mean that we cannot experience truth in a manner that is subj ect to intc'l'rctation. debate and persuasion. He d~scribes his philosophy as "a way. howeve r ·weak.' of experienc ing truth. not as an object whic h can be appropriated and transmitted. but as a horizon and a background upon which we m ay move with care." Vattimo. End ol Modernit)', supra. at 13.
finitude. The kenosis , rather than an abasement of divinity , represents the power of being within a historical horizon , the power of the Word made flesh.
Vattimo can speak of God as the one who is incarnated into language or, better, into an announcement which has lost the oppressive weight of the foundational principle. God is disclosed as a trace that makes itself felt in our language, and which appeals to us through the dialogical force of charity. In tum, if charity is understood in the light of kenosis , the self-exhaustion of God , then it constitutes the most sublime act of abandonment for the sake of the other. To participate in the hermeneutic experience, then, might mean to welcome the other in the name of the dialogical principle of charity , that is, by listening to the non-violent reasons of the other.
41
God is an announcement within our history that must be continually interpreted by the guiding light of charity. This foundational faith brings Vattimo back to Christianity , from which he had never really escaped, as an ongoing project rather than a dictate from outside history.
What does Vattimo's work teach us about Biblical and legal hermeneutics ? Vattimo argues that the return of religion is a symptom of our time and that po st-metaphysical philosophy clears the way for the recognition of belief . This means that the connection between legal interpretation and scriptural interpretation runs much deeper than Pelikan suggests , and in a different direction . It is not fruitful to seek a general methodology of interpretation by examining these two di scipline s, but it is fruitful to recognize in these practices our fate as interpretive beings . 42 Law and religion are undecidable. Both requir e a leap of faith to sustain a practice th at will never come to an end. The
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idea that we might achieve perfect justice on earth is as implausible as the idea that we might complete our encounter with God. Vattimo emphasizes that we find ourselves in the midst of belief, believing only that we believe, and augmenting our belief through the hermeneutical and rhetorical practices that Gadamer artfully describes. Vattimo's thought may be "weak," but it has critical bite. Gadamer reveals that the de-centering experience of critique occurs when the interpreter risks her prejudices by engaging a text, and Vattimo extends these insights by emphasizing that this experience is always already underway and fated never to be completed.
Belief propels us to relinquish our subjective designs and to attend to the other (person or text) that we encounter in dialogue. This is the Word: not a command to be followed, but a conversation to be taken up faithfully.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE DESTABILIZING AND CR!TlCAL DIMENSIONS OF BELIEF AS A CONSTITUTIVE FEATURE OF INTERPRETING A TEXTUAL TRADITION
Jaroslav Pelikan concludes that Cardinal Newman's "notes" for assessing a vibrant hermeneutical tradition apply equally well to law and religion. These notes will trouble the methodological mind, for they provide no means to prove that an ongoing tradition is vibrant rather than corrupted. This does not indicate that Pelikan has failed, for any assessment of a tradition is no less hermeneutical and rhetorical in nature than the development of the tradition. Gadamer and Vattimo help to show that the notes illuminate our condition, and that this condition is one of belief. There is no methodological means to perceive the truth of a textual tradition , and so it is hardly an indictment of Pelikan that he does not provide a description of what cannot be done.
Belief is not uncritical or dogmatic. Vattimo embraces the message of the Christian gospels, even though he is a gay, progressive public intellectual who rejects much of Italian institutionalized Catholicism. It is Vattimo 's deep and abiding belief in the Christian tradition that fuels his critique of the modem Catholic Church. Episcopal Bishop John Shelby Spong provides a similar example. Spong has provocatively challenged the Christian tradition as a believer, finding in his beliefs a critical distance from the pre-modem worldview of institutionalized religion. His dissenting declaration resonates well with legal critics, much as Newman's homage to religion resonates with them.
So while claiming to be a believer, and still asserting my deeply held commitment to Jesus as Lord and Christ, I also recognize that 1 live in a state of exile from the presuppositions of my own
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The only thing I know to do in this moment of Christian histoty is to enter this exile, to feel its anxiety and discomfort, but to continue to be a believer.
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Thus is our fate~in law, religion and life. The ethical question is how we take up the challenge that is our inheritance as believers. 
